Article Critique With Functioning Kidneys for All
Postrel (2009) presents strategies being used by organizations in trying to shorten the donor waiting lists. Both paired exchanges and donor chains are used to increase the number of donors available to kidney transplants potential recipients. Paired exchanges allow incompatible donors to find compatible recipients through a pair of donors and recipients who will both benefit the kidney recipients. However, this strategy can only reduce the waiting list so far plus its economic limitations bar its effectiveness. Although donor chains provide better chances for waiting recipients to receive compatible donors, it still has no capacity to elevate the increasing waiting list. As such Postrel (2009) proposes the need for compensation and financial incentives for donors in order to increase the number of kidney donors. In addition to this, these factors would reduce the financial expenses incurred by long dialysis patients. This paper seeks to present an economic argument in favor of Postrels argument. Among the aspects to be discussed include the justification for compensations using the demand and supply analysis, using the concept that compensation and financial incentives can reduce expenditures and increase overall economic benefits. Furthermore, this strategy would work towards crippling transplant tourism which is costing the nation hefty millions of dollars. It is also important to acknowledge that such a system will only function advantageously if it is well regulated. With such a system in place its accrued advantages will definitely overshadow any arguments against them.
Postrel (2009) has clearly highlighted the existence of a gap between the demand for kidneys and their supplies. This disparity between demand and supply has resulted to various unsatisfactory implications. In essence, there seems to be long waiting lists for recipients which exceed the various donor registries capacities to supply. Also, when patients finally reach the top of the list they are often older and sicker which limits successful kidney transplantations. As an economist, this observation leads to the development of ideas meant to equilibrate this gap and at the same time evaluating the factors causing this discrepancy. Following this mindset, it is obvious that current efforts supporting the increment of kidney donors are being encumbered by various obstacles. Even though, altruistic donors have contributed to most of the live donations over the years practitioners need to create room for more altruism. This can be done by the use of incentives or compensations for live donors.
Allowing the use of these incentives could drastically increase the supply of kidneys and therefore eliminate the long waiting recipient lists. Using financial incentives live donors would be amiable to taking the risk of parting with their kidneys for an attractive price. Indeed, the current altruism based strategy offers compensation to donors in non-monetary values but in the form of satisfaction for saving another life. Regardless of how priceless this may be the ultimate question remains as whether there is a defined price by which the society is willing to tolerate as kidney patients die waiting for donations. Individuals and organizations opposing the use of financial incentives need to rethink their stands and try to imagine their reactions when there is an increase in the number of kidney patients dying on a daily basis.
Another factor which clearly fosters the use of compensation and incentives is the expected benefit of reducing expenditures and in turn leading to economic growth. Kidney patients not only carry the burden of their malfunctioned organs but also a great financial burden. For those who have been on waiting lists for long, they end up incurring so many expenses both in dialysis and their up keep. These individuals live on specialized diets and may have to part with more finances when purchasing foods.
Furthermore, their trips to and from the hospitals also incur large costs. In addition, there are the psychological strains which affect both the waiting recipients and their families. Having to deal with stress related illnesses and other psychological ailments also costs them heavily. Evidently, the long waiting lists are in no way contributing to the positive growth of the countrys revenues. Furthermore, patients suffering from kidney diseases more often than not have to terminate their employment and stay home. In doing so, they reduce the amounts of collected revenues. Also, they become reliant on the government for their upkeep through disability payments. Eventually, kidney illnesses are observed to go against sound financial management views which advocate for spending less and saving more.
Allowing the use of incentives is not only bound to decrease the numbers of patients in waiting lists but it will also cut down on overall expenditure. In comparison with long time dialysis, kidney transplants are relatively less costly. Postrel (2009, p.7) emphasizes that kidney transplants are estimated to save to almost 100,000 worth of medical costs. Definitely with an increment of these transplants using an incentive system would lead to the saving of more costs. Apart from decreasing these costs, more kidney transplants would lead to an increase in revenue as former patients would resume to work and contribute to the countrys income tax revenues. Kidney transplants offer patients a new lease of life and almost all patients can resume to their normal active lives. Other tangible benefits are also seen in the lives of family members of patients as they are free to resume to their lifestyles which may have been impeded by having to support a kidney patient. Furthermore, medical practitioners stand to gain financial benefits from kidney transplants. Doctors, administrators and staff members whose work depends on the number of transplants will receive payments for each transplant and also get to validate their effectiveness in their professions. Most donor registries which are run by institutions may gain credible reputation with the increment of live donations and subsequent transplants.
Graham and Livingston (2009, p.350) assert that international organ trafficking is largely fuelled by the presence of ample available organs in the US. Organ trafficking and tourism transplants are consequences of a restrictive all altruism based kidney donation system. As such people desperate to have back their lives or save their loved ones will go to great extremes of ensuring that they have acquired a compatible donor. Organ trafficking involves illegal cartels which foster the traveling of individuals to purchase kidneys from. Not only do they incur numerous expenses on these trips but they also charge the recipients hefty fees for the kidneys. This form of exploitation is bound to accelerate if no alternative measures are put in place to accommodate the shortcomings of the altruism based system. Furthermore, those who undertake tourism transplants have to use similarly numerous expenses which may deplete their financial resources. Instead of encouraging transplant tourism, the use of a regularized financial incentives system may offer such patients the benefits of acquiring a kidney for a reasonable amount of money.
In reality, there is an illegal black market for kidneys which is wrought by numerous malpractices which cost the health system dearly. Arguably there are already individuals willing to pay for a kidney and will not hesitate in doing so if presented the opportunity. However, in the black market they are exposed to many hazards which may be well avoided if they had legal means of acquiring kidneys. Further, elimination of the black market by such a system may result to health benefits for the donor and the entire society. In the current black market, organ trafficking is likely to be designed in such a way that there is intentional use of vendors whose health is inclined to deteriorate. In addition, their economic values may also decline. This is facilitated because most vendors from lower societal class levels are predisposed to poverty and are likely to make uninformed decisions. These characteristics further heighten their risks and are therefore liable to benefit from a regulated vendor compensated system.
Following these arguments in favor of a regulated compensated donor system it is paramount to note that such a system can only accrue the highlighted economic benefits if it is appropriately modeled. This means that there should be governing principles which out rightly distinguishes it from organ trafficking. Such a system first of all requires price regulations for kidney fees so as to cater for both the rich and the poor. More often than not arguments against compensations for kidney donors debate that such a system would discriminate the poor or exploit them. However, with a price regulation system there is a likelihood of preventing such incidences. Furthermore this counter argument may not hold as with highly developed countries there is an eminent recognition for personal sacrifices which is also available for the poor. Other factors to be considered include the priority for safety especially for the vendor and recipient. This consideration eliminates the possibilities of incurring further expenses due to aborted transplants. In addition, donors and recipients need to be made aware of the potential risks and outcomes of their actions. In line with this should be an establish rule of law which safeguards interests of both donors and recipients should there be cause to seek redress.
Postrel (2009) has waved an intricate article which not only enlightens the public on the nature of kidney donations but which also creates urgency for a better kidney donor system. A regulated compensation system as proposed by Postrel (2009) will as above discussed accrue economic benefits for the country, sever the gap between demand for kidney donors and supply and at the same time eliminate organ trafficking and transplant tourism. A compensation system will in overall offer more benefits for Americans than the altruism based system.